The Legacy of National Parks: Community-Based Conservation in Tanzania and Zimbabwe

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Introduction

Wildlife conservation in Africa has long depended on a system of national parks. These parks were, for the most part, born from a tradition of European colonial rule; their roots lie in the enclosure movement in England and the Western game hunters of the early part of the 20th century. When these hunters eventually turned their sights from killing African wildlife to preserving it, they maintained their utter disregard of local human communities. Inherent in their concept of preservationism was the understanding that only ‘civilized’, white Westerners could appreciate nature.

As a result, national parks were established with little regard for the livelihoods of local people, and have often disrupted or destroyed them. Their creation has often involved forced evictions and can interrupt ecological knowledge and subsistence practices. In addition, the parks have often contributed to ecological devastation, as they force more people on to smaller plots of land, disrupt anthropogenic ecosystems, and can result in an overpopulation of elephants, wildebeest, or tsetse flies. Most significantly, however, the parks have established a pattern of antagonism between local people and conservation practices.

In recent decades, conservationists have recognized the necessary involvement of local communities in the protection of their resources. As a result, they have made a conscious effort to involve villagers in this process through community-based conservation. These programs, however, have struggled to escape the antagonistic legacy of national parks and the preservationist ethic. This paper will explore the results of community-based conservation in two contrasting contexts: Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

In Tanzania, efforts have largely focused on creating “buffer-zone” areas around national parks to reduce local opposition to them. In addition, the
programs have remained top-down endeavors, run by national parks authorities and international NGO’s. Tanzanian community-based conservation has made little headway towards separating itself from the legacy of national parks; as a result, local people have been reluctant to cooperate with the efforts. Conversely, the Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe has largely succeeded in devolving authority to the community level and providing direct economic incentives for conservation. As such, it has been much more well-received and effective.

Still, even the relatively successful Zimbabwean programs are not a catchall solution; they have profound faults of their own and are not applicable to all situations. Comparing them to Tanzanian conservation efforts does, however, yield a beneficial conclusion—those programs which most diverge from the tradition of national parks are most likely to garner support amongst local communities. With this in mind, a program of adaptive management could effectively remedy the flaws of African conservation.
The Creation of African National Parks

The first African national parks were a direct and devastating product of European colonialism. They were based on Western traditions of land use and perceptions of nature. Colonial authorities sought to create idealized Edens devoid of human interference, and in the process of making them showed complete disregard for the rights of their human inhabitants. From the earliest days of their establishment, African national parks were at odds with the interests of local people.

In the first half of the twentieth century, sub-Saharan Africa was generally under the influence of European—largely British—colonial rule. These colonial powers already possessed an established tradition of the enclosure of nature. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a series of enclosure acts in England had essentially eliminated communal cultivated land. The laws dispensed with the commons and resulted in the seizure of vast tracts of land by a dominant capitalist class. Accompanying these acts was a change in the idealized view of nature to that of an undisturbed Eden. The Romantic Movement was in full force, as authors throughout Europe and America turned to nature as a source of inspiration. Likewise, landscape painting represented a new view of the outdoors, and these “idealized paintings of natural landscapes served as models for the British aristocracy to re-create the pastoral in their estate parks”\(^1\). The enclosure acts, the Romantics, landscape painting, and the rise of the estate all contributed to an exclusive and idealized view of nature in England. During this time, it became commonplace for the rich to seize the land of the lower classes in order to reclaim their piece of undisturbed nature. Inevitably, African colonialism mirrored this movement. Conservation had

become a symbol of status, even when it meant seizing and enclosing the land of the poor. Colonial authorities were quick to do so in the form of national parks.²

African national parks were also inextricably intertwined with a tradition of game hunting. One of the earliest of these great hunters was Frederick Courteney Selous, who hunted extensively in the late nineteenth century. The Selous Game Reserve, located in Tanzania and one of the largest in Africa, now bears the irony of his name.³

Perhaps the best known and most significant of these great hunters, however, was Theodore Roosevelt. His 1909 safari spanned ten months, and “Roosevelt and his son Kermit bagged more than five hundred animals of over seventy different species”.⁴ The expedition as a whole shipped animals to the Smithsonian by the thousands. Several books and the international media widely publicized Roosevelt’s safari and successfully instigated a new age of big game hunting in Africa. Ironically, Roosevelt strongly advocated national parks and wildlife refuges in America. His presidency saw the establishment of the United States Forest Service and the creation of five national parks, as well as numerous national forests, reserves, and monuments.

Men like Roosevelt predominated much of the history of African national parks. In 1903, Edward North Buxton, a British aristocratic hunter, formed the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire (SPFE), which would become a dominant force in African conservation. Many of its members were prominent hunters, and the British public frequently referred to them as the Penitent Butchers. These men spearheaded a 1933 Convention for the Protection of African Flora and Fauna, which “called for setting aside areas

² Ibid., 15-37.
⁴ Ibid., 28.
for wildlife that had fixed boundaries and were large enough to permit migration”. In addition, the SPFE generally opposed any human presence in the parks they sought to establish. From the perspective of “administrative officers…hunting by African residents inside the proposed parks was acceptable”. The powerful members of the SPFE, however, put forth a misconception of native hunting practices as inhumane; they recommended the exclusion of all local people’s rights in any national park. The butchers’ call became an influential one, and the game reserves and national parks they established became the foundation of a decidedly persistent system.

The ethic surrounding the creation of national parks, then, had its roots in colonialism and aristocracy and was deeply and inherently racist. Westerners created the parks with the assumption that Africans were not civilized enough to appreciate nature or capable enough to manage their own resources. Their purpose was to enclose for the enjoyment of Westerners an idealized Eden, devoid of human interference. Rosaleen Duffy notes that the parks “grew out of the belief that the state can preserve habitats in a pristine condition and that rural people were not capable of managing the environment”. Likewise, Neumann notes that “the new meanings embodied in the scenic landscape of [the national parks] are addressed to the visitor. The pleasing prospects of the park, for most of the [people] living nearby, are incommensurate with their own history and interests in the land”. A group of powerful and self-serving hunters advocated and established the parks, and so they were rooted in racist and colonial notions. As the 20th century progressed, the focus fully shifted from hunting to preservationism, but relations between Westerners and African wildlife maintained their air of racism and reckless disregard for local peoples.

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5 Ibid., 47.
8 Neumann, 50.
In Tanzania, German and then British colonial rule laid the foundation of the parks system. Tanzania’s first park, Serengeti National Park, was established with set boundaries in 1951. Although it originally allowed for the continued occupation of local pastoralists, a 1959 National Park Ordinance supported by the SPFE established Tanzanian national parks as devoid of human rights and occupation. Serengeti’s inhabitants were evicted, while the adjoining Ngorongoro Crater was proclaimed a conservation area where the pastoralists would be allowed to remain. Serengeti became a paradigm for the establishment of Tanzanian parks, as a pattern of forced displacement emerged. Since then, as Roderick Neumann estimates, the creation of Tanzanian parks has evicted nearly 60,000 people.

In one such instance, colonial authorities evicted 3,000 of the local Meru people from the Ngare Nanyuki region on November 17, 1951. Neumann recalls the human rights offences committed by the officials:

> The government burned the houses to the ground with all the food and possessions inside, including small livestock…one evicted pregnant woman gave birth in the bush and her baby died four days later, while seven other women suffered miscarriages.

These brutal evictions originally created space for the resettlement of white Westerners. Later, however, the land was incorporated into colonial game reserves and then Arusha National Park. The Tanzanian National Parks Authority (TANAPA) eliminated any remaining rights of the Meru people to the land, including the right to gather wood and the existence of a right-of-way

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9 Ibid., 129, 138.
10 Ibid., 147.
11 Ibid., 69.
12 Ibid., 72.
to transport crops and livestock. Colonialism and conservation trumped the customary land rights of the Meru.

In another occurrence, documented by Dan Brockington, the Tanzanian Ministry of the Environment evicted 5,000 pastoralists from the Mkomazi Game Reserve in 1988. As with Ngare Nanyuki, there is evidence of human rights offences committed during the evictions. In addition, Brockington notes the disastrous effects that the eviction had on the local people, as it sandwiched them between the reserve and nearby mountains and gave them little space to graze their livestock. The results of this compression included an abrupt decrease in the numbers of cattle and small livestock sold at markets, herd mortality, an increase in agriculture as a subsistence system, a decrease in women’s earnings, and changes in diet. All of these effects influenced most significantly those who were already poor. On a national level, the history of Tanzanian national parks has been one of violence and impoverishment.

Similarly, wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe is rooted in colonialism and hostility. Although many of Zimbabwe’s parks have emerged after the country’s independence, Rosaleen Duffy notes that their principle of excluding local people has its roots in “the colonial notion that it was the role of colonial administrators to teach local people about wildlife and conservation”. 12.7% of Zimbabwe’s land is now contained in the Parks and Wildlife estate and off-limits to occupation by local peoples. As in Tanzania, the creation of Zimbabwean parks often resulted in eviction and impoverishment. Duffy notes

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13 Ibid., 148-156.
14 Ibid., 147.
16 Ibid., 17.
17 Ibid., 95-99, 145-146.
18 Duffy, 24.
the case of Gonarezhou, where a new national park required the removal of the people living there.19 Another eviction, this time affecting the Nyaki and Lupane districts, displaced thousands in the 1940’s and 50’s. The eviction originally displaced people from land for white settlement, not the creation of a park. Still, it bore important consequences for conservation. The displaced herders—who were relatively well-educated and successful farmers and herders—“suffered greatly in adapting to their new environment”. Their cattle died quickly from new types of grass and disease, and many people suffered from malaria.20 This eviction resulted in antagonism between local people and colonial authorities that would later have extreme repercussions for conservation efforts. As in Tanzania, colonialism and the creation of parks in Zimbabwe were destructive affairs.

The Effects of National Parks

The effects of national parks, like the process of their creation, have been similar in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In both countries, the parks have resulted in the displacement and impoverishment of countless local people. Furthermore, they have actually often contributed to environmental degradation.

In their discussion of African parks, Michael Cernea and Kai Schmidt-Soltau explicate these effects well in their Impoverishment Risk and

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19 Ibid.
Reconstruction Model for Involuntary Resettlement. They identify eight distinct risks for evicted peoples:21

1. Landlessness

Forced evictions can deprive locals of both the areas in which they live and the land on which they generate an income; in many cases, “their losses are neither compensated nor replaced by any alternative income source as a part of a post-displacement reconstruction strategy”. The communities “commonly express the view that conservation has taken their forest and forced them into poverty”. National parks often deprive evictees of the land they need to thrive.

2. Joblessness

The loss of land and traditional lifestyles makes it “unlikely that people displaced from national parks will be able to reconstruct their livelihood” without viable alternatives and extensive training. Ecotourism typically does not provide an economic alternative, as it often cannot generate sufficient revenue.

3. Homelessness

The loss of land results directly in the loss of a home, and rebuilding can often prove difficult. This can lead to “a decreasing health situation and a decreasing acceptance of the resettlement process”. Homelessness can further poverty and antagonism.

4. Marginalization

The loss of traditional rights associated with eviction can result in political marginalization. In addition, ethnic and language differences can prevent evictees from fully acclimating to a new area.

5. Food Insecurity

21 Michael M. Cernea and Kai Schmidt-Soltau, “Poverty Risks and National Parks: Policy Issues in
Changes in land tenure and increased impoverishment can negatively affect the diet of evictees. Without secure rights to land, local people cannot reliably produce sufficient food.

6. Increased Mortality

The shock of eviction and exposure to new areas often results in increased occurrence of diseases such as HIV and malaria. Further impoverishment means that medical services are not a viable option for many people.

7. Loss of Access to Common Property

Because much of traditional land use in Africa depends on system of communal lands, loss of access to common areas can be equally or more destructive than loss of personal property.

8. Social Disarticulation

Forced evictions often affect communities that are already politically vulnerable. Eviction further diminishes their social and political authorities, as “the forced change of lifestyle atomizes the existing social links within the band and in its relation to others”. Eviction can destroy social systems within communities and decrease their political influence.

Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau effectively identify and categorize negative impacts of eviction from national parks that can result in discontent and antagonism. Although they apply these risks specifically to parks in the Congo basin, they are equally applicable to Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Aside from the obvious effects of land loss and homelessness, national parks have adversely affected communities in Tanzania and Zimbabwe in a number of ways. People who have long inhabited one area build up a

foundation of environmental knowledge of their surroundings; they manifest this understanding through effective subsistence systems and lifestyles. When national parks force these people to move, their environmental knowledge often becomes irrelevant. This, combined with a simple decrease in available land, can often result in drastic lifestyle changes.

One group particularly affected in this manner is the pastoralists of Tanzania. These people traditionally depend on herding large groups of cattle. As such, they are particularly dependent on large tracts of land and their knowledge of its productivity. When evictions invalidate their environmental knowledge and diminish the land available to them, they are often forced into different and less sustainable lifestyles. Brockington acknowledges that previous to the evictions at Mkomazi, “herds were large enough to forgo farming”, but the loss of land meant that many pastoralists turned to agriculture as the only viable alternative. Likewise, Jim Igoe discusses the plight of Maasai herders forced to relinquish much of their herding land in the creation of Tarangire National Park. Before the establishment of the park, the pastoralists maintained a carefully devised pasturing system. During the dry season, pastures centered on a permanent water source. In the wet season, however, the Maasai moved their herds to outlying areas, giving the dry season pasture time to recover. In addition, they maintained many of the best and most reliable water sources as drought reserves, which in the event of a severe drought could maintain large numbers of livestock. The herders passed down this system carefully from generation to generation, and it effectively “[ensured] the sustainability of the system on a year-to-year basis”. Tarangire National Park, however, enclosed much of the land necessary to uphold these procedures, often cutting off the herders from drought reserves and the best dry season water sources. The National Park “restricted herders to ever-shrinking

22 Brockington, 144.
tracts of their worst pasture, rendering their resource management systems increasingly less viable. Without time to recover, pastures began to deteriorate, resulting in what colonial livestock officers…referred to as overgrazing”. Not only did the park strip the Maasai of a necessary aspect of their livelihood, it also contributed to environmental degradation. Furthermore, the impoverished herders often turned to farming, which can further fragment and damage environments.

In addition, the day-to-day realities of national parks can present a number of problems to neighboring villages. The close proximity of high numbers of park animals can result in the destruction of crops and threaten the lives of villagers. Neumann notes that “the most critical aspect of the management conflict is the destruction of food crops by wildlife coming from inside the park”. He describes instances in which park wildlife destroyed 50 to 100 percent of some crops nearly overnight. In addition, “people living on the park boundary and going into the bush of the village commons to collect fuelwood or graze cattle are under a daily threat of personal injury and death caused by wildlife”. Women and children often cannot tend herds or gather wood on their own, and animals often kill up to several people a year in villages neighboring parks. Conservation authorities and governments rarely compensate local people for these hardships. In addition, they have consistently shown an unwillingness to kill troublesome animals. Furthermore, those people who do cross into the park to subsistence hunt are often labeled as poachers and shot. Duffy notes that in Zimbabwe in 1990, “more poachers

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24 Ibid., 54.
25 Neumann, 168.
26 Ibid., 172.
were killed than rhinos”.27 The mere proximity of national parks can have deadly consequences in the daily lives of villagers.

Furthermore, parks often serve to degrade the very environments they seek to protect. In Tanzania, the early decades of parks—when their negative effects had taken hold but management situations had not yet stabilized—“witnessed a dramatic decline in elephant numbers and the loss of rhinoceros to illegal trophy hunters”.28 In Zimbabwe, conversely, large populations of elephants grow larger in national parks and can destroy the environment. As a result, conservation officials often must cull elephants to prevent overpopulation.29 30

Perhaps most significantly, however, conservationists have often failed to recognize that the landscapes they enclose are essentially anthropogenic. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a rinderpest plague swept much of Africa, killing 90 to 95 percent of cattle on the continent and decimating human populations. Although wildlife populations were affected as well, they rebounded much more quickly. As a result, the Africa that the first colonial authorities observed was one unusually devoid of human occupation.31 This image of a wild Africa has been a persistent one, and national parks are largely based on the premise that they are restoring Africa to its natural state. In reality, however, these environments have coexisted with and often depended on human habitation for hundreds of years, and the sudden absence of human impact can actually have a negative effect on the ecosystem. Before the establishment of the parks, herders often used controlled fires to improve grazing and promote the growth of grasses and small shrubs. This process

27 Duffy, 49.
28 Neumann, 162.
29 Adams and McShane, 77-78.
30 Duffy, 132.
created favorable grazing conditions not only for cattle but for buffalo, elephants, and rhinos as well. Since the creation of the parks, however, the grazing of wildlife alone cannot maintain these conditions, and in some areas “the ratio of herbs to woody vegetation has declined considerably”.32 The sudden absence of anthropogenic influences has actually resulted in less favorable grazing conditions for wildlife. The increasing brush coverage also results in an increased abundance of the tsetse flies that can carry sleeping sickness.33 Conservationists have long been unwilling to recognize that the landscapes they enclose are anthropogenic; as a result, the parks can actually contribute to the destruction of the environment.

All of these adverse effects of national parks have contributed to a brewing atmosphere of antagonism surrounding conservation efforts as a whole. In both Tanzania and Zimbabwe, national parks have displaced, impoverished, and endangered local people. In these people’s minds, then, conservation is simply an extension of colonialism. Neumann notes the opposition parks have caused:

The humiliation and deprivation that people living on the park boundary experience cannot do other than resurrect memories of the worst injustices of the colonial government…if villagers are drawing parallels between the national park and colonial repression, it raises questions about the effectiveness of wildlife conservation policies and underscores the severity of the conflict.34

National parks are a failing system. They have had countless adverse effects on local people and have often contributed to environmental degradation. Most significantly, however, they have established in the minds of local people a deeply held distrust of conservation efforts as a whole.

32 Neumann, 159.
33 Ibid., 168.
34 Ibid., 194.
In recent decades, conservationists have begun to recognize the negative aspects of national parks. Increasingly, they have sought conservation solutions that do not impoverish and antagonize local people. Still, the parks are a persistent illusion. Duffy recognizes that they are too well-established to be discarded entirely. The parks “generate revenue through tourism”, and to deproclaim them “would be a deeply unpopular decision amongst donors [and] NGO’s”.35 The national parks draw tourists and their money to Africa’s wildlife; likewise, they appeal to international conservation organizations. Africa’s national parks are not succeeding in the battle towards conservation, but they are too persistent and appealing to be completely abandoned.

35 Duffy, 25.
In the past several decades, conservationists have come to recognize the importance of community involvement and acceptance in conservation programs. As a result, there has been a sudden advent of programs claiming to involve local people directly in the management of their own resources. Generally, these community-based conservation (CBC) programs have sought to provide economic incentives to local people and give them some amount of control over their own resources. A large number of these programs have appeared in Tanzania, beginning in the late 1980’s. In most cases, though, they have failed to devolve any authority and have remained distrusted by local people. The conservation community generally views Tanzanian community conservation programs as failures.

One such example of a failed CBC initiative is the Selous Conservation Program. This program was designed to reduce local opposition to Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania. In a general sense, it sought to provide communities neighboring the park with an economic incentive to support it. Alexander Songorwa notes that, in convincing the local people to participate in the program, conservation officials promised them pumped water, improved health and education services, meat, employment, and support for income-generating projects.36

These promises were necessary because the people were immediately wary of any conservation program, suspecting that “it was just another government strategy to identify those who were still involved in poaching and who had illegal guns”.37 The promises made by the conservation officials,

37 Ibid.
however, were at first successful. The people “were more interested in collecting revenues from wildlife and other natural resources and having legal access to those resources than in conserving them”.\textsuperscript{38} The promise of meat and money was enough to convince the local people to participate in the Selous Conservation Program.

Unfortunately, this turned out to be an empty promise. Conservation officials were less concerned with the well-being of the local people than they were with warming them to the game reserve. As soon as the people had accepted the program, officials discontinued the income generating portions. One staff member remarked, “when we saw…that the people trusted us…we decided not to continue with that component”.\textsuperscript{39} Without any control over wildlife resources, little economic benefit, and a slew of broken promises, the people had little incentive for continued cooperation with the program.

Unrealized expectations were not the only strike against the Selous Conservation Program. Songorwa also identifies the extreme costs the program bore for the community. Among them were “crop damage, predation on livestock and people, reduction of the workforce in households, communities falling under control of outsiders, reduced access to land and wildlife, and conflicts created within and between communities”.\textsuperscript{40} The program further exacerbated the risks that living near a game reserve already provided. In addition, the program depended on the volunteered labor of game scouts, whose service to the conservationists deprived them of time to be with their families and engage in other employment. Finally, the zoning and surveillance contained in the program often reduced people’s access to land and wildlife.

Most significantly, however, the communities simply mistrusted the conservation authorities. They had already weathered the negative affects of the

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 2066.  
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 2069.
game reserve, and they “speculated that the program was a government strategy
to force them out of the area…[and] they were not going to be allowed to
utilize natural resources in those areas”.41 The program did little to distinguish
itself from previous conservation efforts. It gave the people no stewardship
over their resources or their economic benefits, as they could not even
withdraw the earned money without approval from a District Game Officer.
Without control of their wildlife, their land, or their money, the people saw the
program as simply another injury imposed by the conservationists. Once the
promises of meat and money had deteriorated, “the communities were generally
not interested”.42 The Selous Conservation Program failed to separate itself
from the legacy of the parks and garner the involvement of local people.

In another case, the Tarangire-Manyara region, the CBC program
focused on the creation of Wilderness Management Areas (WMA’s). These
areas were, in theory, areas outside of national parks where local communities
could take stewardship of their resources. In truth, however, they were
“defined through centralized state power for the sole purpose of conserving
biodiversity”.43 While they claimed to devolve power to communities, Mara
Goldman notes that their actual goal was to transform local people “from
enemies to facilitators of the conservation process”.44 They sought not to help
the people but to help the parks. WMA’s in Tarangire-Manyara did not provide
a friendlier alternative to the parks system, but instead served to extend
TANAPA’s influence beyond the park borders.

Goldman carefully distinguishes between passive participation in
conservation, in which communities simply collect the monetary benefits of
CBC programs, and active participation, in which they are truly owners and

41 Ibid., 2073.
42 Ibid., 2074.
43 Mara Goldman, “Partitioned Nature, Privileged Knowledge: Community-based Conservation in
44 Ibid.
managers of their resources. The WMA’s of the Tarangire-Manyara region, she argues, exemplified passive participation. The government retained ownership of the wildlife, and use rights were only passed down to communities through the power of the Minister. In addition, the traditional knowledge of the local people was discounted as insignificant, and “local communities [were] not recognized as capable decision-makers”.

In some instances, the authorities’ refusal to accept traditional knowledge had negative effects on the environment. The combination of the parks and the wilderness management areas extensively fragmented the ecosystem, but because it did so without utilizing local knowledge, “the landscapes created in the process [were] much less responsive to the local ecological processes to which local knowledge [had] adapted”.

The Massai of the Tarangire-Manyara area had a deep understanding of the herding behavior of the region’s animals and the ecological conditions of the area, but conservation officials discounted this knowledge as unscientific and worthless.

With few real rights over their resources and little attention paid to their knowledge, the Maasai had little incentive to accept the creation of the WMA’s. Having already been affected by the creation of national parks, they “view the animals as intruders and see conservation as a threat”. They associate conservation with the loss of herding land, and the CBC programs only served to further fragment their landscape. In addition, these programs were developed by the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and TANAPA—the same organizations who spearheaded national parks and other destructive conservation efforts. From the viewpoint of the Maasai, WMA’s were “for the sole benefit of TANAPA”.

As with the Selous project, the CBC programs in

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46 Ibid., 845.
47 Ibid., 851.
48 Ibid., 852.
the Tarangire-Manyara region did little to distinguish themselves from national parks. They could not escape the antagonism of previous conservation efforts and were not accepted by local people.

A third Tanzanian program, documented by Jim Igoe, also tried to improve relationships between local people and national parks. Known as the Good Neighborliness program, it was first implemented in Simanjiro, just outside Tarangire National Park, and Loliondo, just outside Serengeti National Park. As with other Tanzanian CBC programs, TANAPA and the AWF spearheaded Good Neighborliness. The name of the program itself clearly demonstrates its intentions—to garner support for the national park among local communities by providing them with economic and developmental incentives. In theory, the program sought to improve the lives of community members and involve them in the conservation process. In reality, “a general sense of paternalism pervaded the Good Neighborliness project”.49 As with other Tanzanian programs, conservationists did not truly view local people as capable of managing their resources, and so “the objective of this program was presented as one of education, implying that local people simply had the wrong idea”.50 Indeed, those involved with Good Neighborliness often showed a complete disregard for the welfare of surrounding communities. The head of the CBC service center went so far as to say that the objective was “not…to support the herding economy of Simanjiro but simply to foster good relations between national parks and neighboring communities”.51 The Good Neighborliness program did not intend to turn the parks into good neighbors for the communities, but the communities into good neighbors for the parks.

The Maasai herders in these areas were immediately skeptical of the program. The creation of Tarangire National Park in 1970 had evicted them

49 Igoe, 31.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
from much of their land. They suffered the usual effects of this displacement, including loss of pastures, decreased vegetation cover, increased prevalence of tsetse flies, and general impoverishment.52 These communities’ previous experiences with conservation had given them little to like about the movement, and so they were extremely distrustful of Good Neighborliness. Part of the project involved mapping the communities to determine land-use patterns. The people of Simanjiro immediately protested this undertaking, as the last maps that had been made of their area had foreshadowed their eviction. They turned away the mapmakers, saying they “were not prepared to cooperate with the project or Good Neighborliness without a lot more information”.53

The harshest blow dealt to the Good Neighborliness program, however, was the unwillingness of pastoralist NGO’s to cooperate with it. TANAPA and the AWF sought with the inception of the program to partner with one of the local organizations representing the Maasai. The most prominent of these organizations, and thus the obvious choices for partnerships, were KIPOC in Loliondo and Pastoralists of the Highlands in Simanjiro. These groups were well-established and trusted in their respective communities. Both, however, were unwilling to cooperate with the AWF. The leader of KIPOC, Moringe ole Parkipuny, strongly believed that “the Maasai should not be excluded from national parks and other protected areas”.54 He was, then, immediately unwilling to ally with a new program put forth by the parks authority. Likewise, one of the leaders of Pastoralists of the Highlands, Martin Saning’o, accused the AWF of leading the Mkomazi Game Reserve evictions. In addition, his organization “was getting more mileage out of his opposition to the AWF and Good Neighborliness than he would by partnering

52 Ibid., 62-64.
53 Ibid., 125.
54 Ibid., 123.
The obvious choices of NGO’s for the AWF to partner with were unwilling to have anything to do with the program. Instead, the AWF was forced to partner with the Maa People’s Development Organization (Maa PDO). This NGO “sprang from a high-profile urban conference” and “had no organic connections to these communities”. In addition, the communities of Simanjiro generally regarded Maa PDO as corrupt and untrustworthy. The people’s distrust of conservation forced the Good Neighborliness program to ally with an NGO that held no real sway in the community. As a result, “the issue of community remains unresolved for community conservation in Simanjiro”. The Good Neighborliness program ultimately failed because of the people’s distrust of conservation—skepticism rooted in the destructive effects of national parks.

As a whole, Tanzanian community-based conservation programs have not been successful. The local people they target have not developed an interest in the programs and have not taken any substantive control of their resources. The reasons for the failure of these programs are twofold. First, as Mara Goldman notes, “conservation planning in Tanzania remains a top-down endeavor”. Community conservation is still administered by TANAPA and the AWF—the same agencies responsible for the management of national parks. These organizations decide which areas are protected and which are candidates for CBC, and they ultimately make most of the decisions regarding Tanzanian wildlife. Tanzanian CBC is often community-based only in name. The top-down nature of the programs in many ways reflects the state-level organization of Tanzania—the country was under one-party rule for decades

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55 Ibid., 124.
56 Ibid., 126-127.
57 Ibid., 130.
58 Goldman, 833.
after independence, and did not hold democratic elections until 1995. CBC programs, like the government, gave the people little choice.

The second reason for the failure of these programs is that “all [CBC] programs in Tanzania are buffer zone programs”. They target communities on the borders of national parks in an attempt to make relations between people and parks more favorable. In doing so, they aim for people with a history of antagonism towards conservation. Controlled by national parks authorities and located on park borders, Tanzanian CBC programs have done little to separate themselves from the hostile history of African conservation. As a result, the programs have failed.

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59 Songorwa, 2064.
Community-Based Conservation in Zimbabwe

Community-based conservation in Zimbabwe has revolved on a national level on the Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). This program is widely considered a success, and the conservation community looks upon it as a model for future efforts. Although the program certainly has its faults, it has largely succeeded in devolving authority, providing economic incentives, and generally involving local people in the management of their resources. It thus provides an effective and informative basis for comparison with Tanzanian programs.

Zimbabwe’s first effort at community-based conservation was a failed attempt known as Wildlife Industries New Development for All (Windfall). This program sought to provide communities with revenue from the culling of elephants as an incentive to conserve their resources. It did not attempt to give them any control over the regulation of wildlife, but rather to provide them with an economic reason to conserve it. The program ultimately did not succeed because it “failed to make a sufficiently direct linkage between resources and incentives for community-based conservation practice”.60 Little money actually filtered its way through the bureaucracy to the communities. Furthermore, the villagers saw the money that they did receive as government handouts and failed to connect this income with their wildlife resources.61 Although Windfall did not provide a solution for the problems of Zimbabwean conservation, it did suggest a community-based approach to further efforts.

CAMPFIRE began in the late 1980’s as a response to this movement. The foundation of the program lays with the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act. This


61 Adams and McShane, 177-178.
legislation designated landowners as the owners and proper authorities for the wildlife on their land. Originally, the Zimbabwean government applied the act to ranchers, who could then “benefit financially, aesthetically, culturally and ecologically from wildlife conservation efforts in a direct manner”. As the CAMPFIRE program developed, however, the government recognized that as the owners of communal lands, communities could act as the patrons of their own resources. With this in mind, the Zimbabwean government and conservationists established CAMPFIRE with four main objectives:

1. To initiate a program for the long-term development, management, and sustainable utilization of natural resources for the Communal Areas.
2. To achieve management of resources by placing the custody and responsibility with the resident communities.
3. To allow communities to benefit directly from the exploitation of natural resources within the Communal Area.
4. To establish the administrative and institutional structures necessary to make the program work.

In practice, these objectives translated into the devolvement of authority over wildlife to Rural District Councils. These councils existed before the establishment of CAMPFIRE and divide the country into 58 locally governed districts. Under the program, the Councils and the parks authority agree upon a hunting quota for the region, and the council enforces the quota, collects all revenue, and distributes it to the community as it sees fit. In this manner, the program effectively gives communities real control of their resources.

One area where CAMPFIRE has achieved notable success is the Hurungwe district. The program began here in 1989, and since then has

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62 Duffy, 16.
63 Metcalfe, 14.
drastically improved local opinions of wildlife. Victoria Butler notes a small but significant decline in poaching, as local people have realized that an animal is worth more if killed by a foreign hunter than poached for meat. The people have generally become more accepting of the animals and far more willing to conserve them. The reason for this transformation is the substantial amount of money the program has brought to the region. In 1993, CAMPFIRE brought in $145,519 to Hurungwe district. The Council then distributed the money to individual households, and in some villages these dividends were as high as $54 a year. In contrast, average household income in Zimbabwe in 1992 was just $2,628. A member of a local wildlife committee noted that the villagers “like [the animals] more because [they are] getting money for them”.

CAMPFIRE in Hurungwe does, however, face a critical problem. The villages in the region have varying availabilities of wildlife resources, and “villages with no wildlife resources receive no CAMPFIRE funds”. The varying resources and revenues within the district have caused some tension, as some villages receive large dividends while others receive none. Still, this problem has been minor in the face of the good CAMPFIRE has enacted in the region. In one instance, neighboring villages gave a town with fewer resources the money to buy a grinding mill. In another village, money from the program has financed a desperately needed medical clinic. In Hurungwe, CAMPFIRE has served well both people and wildlife. The program has given communities real stewardship over their resources and allowed them to reap the benefits, and as a result they look much more favorably on animals and conservation.

The Beitbridge district in Southeast Zimbabwe provides another example of successful CAMPFIRE implementation. As in Hurungwe, this district chose to distribute revenues from the program as individual household dividends. In Chikwarakwara village in 1991, these revenues totaled $400 per

65 Ibid., 40.
household. The village voted to devote part of these funds to build a grinding mill, keeping the other half as a pure cash income. The program not only warmed the district to conservation efforts but also empowered it to take effective control of the resulting revenues. As Simon Metcalfe notes, “the consequent motivation…to become involved in planning their own land use, and building wildlife into rangeland management, has made the project a role model within the overall CAMPFIRE programme”. 67 Similarly to Hurungwe, Beitbridge district has effectively empowered local communities and provided them with economic incentives for conservation.

Beitbridge embraced the ideals of CAMPFIRE even one step further than Hurungwe. While the power in Hurungwe remained at the district level, Beitbridge devolved it to the level of individual villages. This eased the sort of conflict that occurred in Hurungwe and allowed each village to adapt its program to the available resources. Metcalfe calls Beitbridge “the epitome of the CAMPFIRE philosophy, as the smallest accountable unit within the district has been empowered” to adopt good conservation practices and take stewardship of wildlife. 68 Beitbridge district perfectly exemplifies the ways in which CAMPFIRE at its best can involve, empower, and appeal to local communities.

There have, however, been several less successful iterations of CAMPFIRE. One such instance occurred in the Nyaki and Lupane districts. The people in these areas had a particularly troublesome history with conservation programs. A tsetse eradication program had killed thousands of the region’s animals without the people’s consent. In addition, a large number of the residents of the area had been evicted from other regions in the 1940’s and 50’s to make way for white settlement. These evictees “regarded the natural

66 Ibid., 41.
67 Metcalfe, 8.
68 Ibid.
environment of Nyaki and Lupane as wild, dangerous, and uncivilized”. As a result of their eviction, they sought political empowerment through support of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union. They were deeply distrustful of any conservation efforts that seemed to mirror the devastation of colonialism.

Unlike in other districts, CAMPFIRE in Nyaki and Lupane did not successfully separate itself from previous conservation efforts. The District Council avidly supported the program, but the people themselves remained distrustful. The Council grew increasingly forceful in its attempts to instate the program, arguing that it “was the appropriate authority, vested with the legal right to decide what to do with [the land]”. This only angered the people further. From their perspective, CAMPFIRE was established without their input and for the sole interest of the councilors. As an additional mark against the program, CAMPFIRE in these districts carried the potential of further evictions from the area. Finally, “Nyaki and Lupane never received substantial revenue from game”. As a result, “mention of the [program]...was enough to provoke threats of violence”. CAMPFIRE in Nyaki and Lupane was a stunning failure.

These districts highlight many of the aspects of CAMPFIRE that can become problematic if the program is developed improperly. The program did devolve power to the District Council, but the council then held on to this power and implemented the program without the approval of the people. The people had previous negative experiences with conservation, and CAMPFIRE only served to recall their colonial past. Finally, the area did not have sufficient resources to provide a real economic incentive for the conservation of wildlife. CAMPFIRE in these areas did not effectively diverge from the antagonism of colonial conservation.

69 Alexander, 611.
70 Ibid., 622.
71 Ibid., 615.
72 Ibid., 605.
Other districts have had more mixed results. The Nyaminyami District “has a fantastic wildlife resource, as the population of 2,500 elephant, 7,000 cape buffalo, and 30,000 impala alone indicate” (Metcalfe, 6).73 The region has all the necessary resources to be a successful CAPFIRE area, and indeed its program is one of the first and most well-established initiatives. The program “has piloted the most sophisticated resource monitoring procedures of all CAMPFIRE districts”. Among these are the measurement of the age of trophy elephants and the mapping of problem animal and crop damage incidents. The Council has effectively utilized funds for community projects and has begun to develop tourism projects. On the surface, the Nyaminyami project has succeeded.

Still, this initiative has faced serious problems with the devolution of authority. During the formation of the program, “two constitutions were proposed; one with representation of the people through their councillors; the other based on an open membership with direct community representation”.74 Ultimately, the Nyaminyami Trust chose to grant authority to the Council, giving it control of the area’s resources and funds. Although the Parks Authority wished to devolve power to the village and individual level, the relatively new Council “was a lot keener to have authority granted to it than to pass it on down to the Wards and Villages”.75 As a result, the Nyaminyami project has not actually succeeded in involving people and communities in the administration of their resources. The Council gives the people no option of a household dividend. Instead, it gives each Ward an equal share of the profits regardless of its wildlife resources. The Ward decides on a community project to put the funds towards, but the Council is ultimately responsible for carrying it out. While Nyaminyami at first appears to be a successful instance of CAPFIRE, “the communities themselves are not actively participating in the

73 Metcalfe, 6.
74 Ibid., 5.
planning and management process, and appear alienated from both the Trust, and the wildlife on which it depends.”76 Little community management has developed below the district level, and poaching has persisted. Although Nyaminyami has succeeded in managing wildlife and collecting revenue, it has not empowered local communities. Instead, it has created a program “based on a classic park management model” that only serves to give power to the elite members of the District Council.77

In the past two decades, conservationists have lauded CAMPFIRE as the solution to Africa’s resource management problems. The program succeeds in many of the ways in which national parks failed. It involves local people directly in resource management, empowering them politically in the process. It devolves authority from parks authorities and international NGO’s to local District Councils. It provides communities with a financial impetus for conservation and sustainable wildlife management. As in Tanzania, Zimbabwean CBC programs largely reflect the nature of the state-level government. The country has, at least in name, been democratic since independence; both the Zimbabwean government and CAMPFIRE seek to give the people some amount of authority.

Importantly, while CAMPFIRE satisfies local communities, it is equally appealing to conservationists, donors, and NGO’s. Duffy notes that “for the government it is a conservation tool to prevent poaching and wildlife habitat destruction, while for rural people it means wildlife represents development”.78 The parks estate protects only about 12% of Zimbabwe’s land, but the parks combined with CAMFIRE areas cover more than 33%. Local people see in CAMPFIRE the opportunity to benefit from their resources. Development officials see the promise of political empowerment. Conservationists see the

75 Ibid., 6.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Duffy, 91.
preservation of ecosystems and wildlife. On some level, CAMPFIRE is a universal solution to Africa’s conservation woes.

Still, the program faces many problems. The large amounts of revenue that do not pass through the central treasury have caught the attention of the government, and the funds may soon fall into the tax bracket. In addition, the financial impetuses CAMPFIRE provides depend on the presence of significant wildlife resources, and so not all areas provide viable locations for the program. Finally, while many NGO’s support CAMPFIRE, others object to its use of hunting as a source of revenue. This preservationist ethic deprives the program of donor funding, and can also establish other obstacles for CAMPFIRE—the ivory ban, for example, denies the program a potentially sustainable source of revenue. The program has made vast progress towards acceptance by the conservation community, but it has not wholly succeeded.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle CAMPFIRE faces, however, lies with the continued devolution of power to the village and individual levels. The bottom-up nature of the program requires the empowerment of local communities. While this is a noble goal, it is not always immediately plausible after decades of oppressive colonial rule. Metcalfe notes that “there is inadequate legislation to legally empower sub-district administrative units, of the wad and village committees, to manage land tenure and resource use”. Even when wards, villages, and people are capable of taking control, the District Councils are not always willing to pass on power to smaller units of management. As in Nyaminyami, the councils “are reluctant to devolve either management or benefits much below the district level”. CAMPFIRE took a giant leap forward in devolving stewardship of resources to the district level, but

79 Ibid., 110.
80 Ibid., 121-122.
81 Ibid., 93.
82 Metcalfe, 13.
83 Ibid., 17.
the authority has since become stuck there, and the villages and people themselves have not always been empowered. CAMPFIRE has made great progress towards a workable model for African conservation, but it must continue to separate itself from the parks model and devolve authority in order to truly succeed.
Conclusion

National parks in Africa—along with the associated preservationist and colonial ethic—have failed. In recent decades, conservationists have come to accept this failure and have moved to involve local people in the management of their natural resources. Tanzania and Zimbabwe have both been on the forefront of this development, but they have taken profoundly different approaches in their search for a solution.

The national parks deeply alienated local communities. Their creation was rooted in colonialism and evicted, impoverished, and disempowered thousands of people. Further negative effects included the destruction of crops by wildlife, increased mortality rates, further human rights offences, and the loss of traditional lifestyles. The parks have also often negatively impacted the environment, as they forced more people on to smaller plots of land and altered the makeup of anthropogenic landscapes. In their desperate quest to preserve a piece of Eden, conservationists ignored one of their most valuable resources—local people and communities. The parks not only ignored these people but also antagonized them, establishing a pattern of conflict that has become a major obstacle for community conservation projects.

Tanzanian community-based conservation has done little to change this legacy, and has often even built upon it. CBC initiatives in Tanzania are buffer-zone programs, designed to extend conservation outside the borders of national parks. Their purpose is not to overcome the negative aspects of national parks but to improve the relations between parks and people. In addition, the programs are managed by TANAPA and international conservation NGO’s—the same organizations responsible for national parks. As a result, Tanzanian CBC has not overcome the antagonism of previous conservation efforts. The communities have not been willing to accept the influence of the programs, and conservationists often regard these initiatives as failures.
The Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE program, conversely, has in many ways succeeded. It devolves authority over wildlife to Rural District Councils, and allows them to determine the ways in which funds are distributed to villages and individuals. The program appeals to local people, as it provides them with increased power and a source of revenue, but it also appeals to conservationists, who recognize its potential to extend conservation efforts beyond national parks. Unlike Tanzanian programs, CAMPFIRE is not a buffer-zone program, and is not geographically associated with national parks. Likewise, although the parks authority initiated the program, it has since passed on most of that authority to the Councils. In these ways, CAMPFIRE has effectively separated itself from the antagonism of the parks. Still, it has not been a perfect solution. Some districts have struggled to overcome the shadow of previous evictions, while others have been reluctant to devolve power past the council level. The CAMPFIRE programs that have most distinctly separated themselves from the national park model have been the most successful.

Neither Tanzanian nor Zimbabwean CBC, then, provides a catchall solution. A comparison of the two programs, however, does demonstrate that community conservation must break away from the legacy of national parks. Top-down management is no longer a viable system for African conservation. Authority should be devolved, economic incentives provided, and traditional knowledge embraced.

These policies immediately call into question the continued existence of national parks. Jim Igoe, on the one hand, seems to recognize a system of community conservation that could coexist with the parks. He describes a spectrum of community conservation programs stretching from the traditional parks model to buffer-zone programs to comanagement to tribal parks, where local people would take complete responsibility for establishing and administering a protected area. In his view, the national parks are a potential

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84 Igoe, 134-135.
part of a CBC system. Other conservationists, however, have recognized the negative results of the parks, and have called for their eradication. Anderson and Grove suggest that conservation goals “could be met by allocation of five percent of the land area of each country to national parks and equivalent reserves, with these zoned to allow managed consumptive utilization…where this is deemed desirable, and with educated management of natural resources outside conservation areas”. They deem the mere existence of the parks as unnecessary and harmful to conservation efforts, and recommend the removal of most of them. Still, although the parks have had profoundly negative effects, they are an important source of tourist and donor revenue, and the sudden elimination of them would certainly provoke outrage from the international conservation community. While community conservation should seek to escape the legacy of the parks, the parks themselves must persist until significant changes have occurred.

Community-based conservation policies are not always easy to implement. Sub-Saharan Africa encompasses a huge range of natural and economic resources. One area might have many resources and little previous interaction with national parks, while another might have few resources but a history of violent evictions. A program that succeeds in the first area would likely not fare as well in the second. No single solution can work for all areas.

Despite these difficulties, community-based conservation in Africa is moving in the right direction. Programs like CAMPFIRE, while far from perfect, are beginning to separate themselves from the national park model. They devolve authority to local people and seek to heal the alienation that decades of colonial conservation policies have created. As a result, they have been astonishingly well-received by both local people and conservationists. If

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CBC programs can adapt to a variety of situations and escape from the legacy of national parks, they may prove to be the future of African conservation.
Bibliography


