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NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of The U.S. Army (Enlarged Edition) By John R. Deni et al.
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In 2010, NATO decided to expand its ballistic missile defense program, in part because of the American offer to include its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as the centerpiece of an expanded... More > effort. For the Allies' part, few have actually contributed tangible ballistic missile defense assets, in terms of missile interceptors, radars or other sensors, or ballistic missile defense-related platforms. This is likely to have significant implications for the U.S. Army, which has an important but largely underappreciated role in NATO missile defense today. In particular, the Army is likely to face increased manpower demands, materiel requirements, and training needs in order to meet the demand signal created by the NATO ballistic missile defense program. Additionally, Army units involved directly in or in support of ballistic missile defense are likely to face a higher OPTEMPO than currently projected. Ultimately, this will exacerbate the perceived imbalance in transatlantic burden-sharing...< Less
The Promise and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy (Enlarged Edition) By Hal Brands, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
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What is “grand strategy,” and why is it seemingly so important and so difficult? This monograph explores the concept of grand strategy as it has developed over the past several decades.... More > It explains why the concept is so ubiquitous in discussions of present-day foreign policy, examines why American officials often find the formulation of a successful grand strategy to be such an exacting task, and explores the ways in which having a grand strategy can be both useful and problematic. It illustrates these points via an analysis of two key periods in modern American grand strategy—the Truman years at the outset of the Cold War, and the Nixon-Kissinger years in the late 1960s and 1970s—and provides several suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the 21st century.< Less
The Next Arms Race (Enlarged Edition) By Henry D. Sokolski, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute
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With most of the world’s advanced economies now stuck in recession; Western support for defense cuts and nuclear disarmament increasing; and a major emerging Asian power at odds with its... More > neighbors and the United States; it is tempting to think our times are about to rhyme with a decade of similar woes—the disorderly 1930s. Might we again be drifting toward some new form of mortal national combat? Or, will our future more likely ape the near-half-century that defined the Cold War—a period in which tensions between competing states ebbed and flowed but peace mostly prevailed by dint of nuclear mutual fear and loathing? The short answer is, nobody knows. This much, however, is clear: The strategic military competitions of the next 2 decades will be unlike any the world has yet seen.< Less
The Prospects for Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year after the Revolution (Enlarged Edition) By Querine Hanlon, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute
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The Arab Spring began in Tunisia. The tragic self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010 struck a chord of discontent and frustration that ultimately propelled Tunisian President Zine El... More > Abidine Ben Ali to step down barely a month later. The reverberations of this unprecedented series of events were felt throughout the region, and protestors took to the streets in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen. A year later, Tunisia’s remarkable transition continues to influence the region. Tunisia has achieved in 1 year what none of the other Arab Spring states have been able to accomplish. Some have suggested that Tunisia’s transition might even be a model for the Arab Spring countries. The Tunisian military’s refusal to ire on the demonstrators and its decision to eschew an overtly political role in the transition have left the task of creating a new political order in Tunisia to the civilian bureaucracy, nascent political parties, and civil society groups.< Less