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Force And Restraint In Strategic Deterrence: A Game-theorist’s Perspective

ByStrategic Studies InstituteRoger B. Myerson

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This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations. The focus is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author, Professor Roger Myerson, uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence. We should look to such theoretical analysis for basic insights that may have practical importance in policymaking. The main conclusion is that a great power’s use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises.

Details

Publication Date
Jun 21, 2014
Language
English
ISBN
9781312294301
Category
Education & Language
Copyright
All Rights Reserved - Standard Copyright License
Contributors
By (author): Strategic Studies Institute, By (author): Roger B. Myerson

Specifications

Pages
32
Binding
Perfect Bound
Interior Color
Black & White
Dimensions
US Trade (6 x 9 in / 152 x 229 mm)

Keywords

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