This volume consists of a few journal articles that I’ve written (one published, one unpublished), which were based on chapters of my MA dissertation. The other chapters are my masters’ degree chapters as they stand, with some minor corrections. The work was supervised by Prof. Mark Leon of the University of the Witwatersrand, who spent many years enduring my naïvety. I owe him a great debt of thanks. There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct — we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I also consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. There is presently a move afoot which is gaining momentum to use the results of fMRI studies to show that persons are not morally accountable due to their being controlled by antecedent non-conscious brain states. I agree with this position and argue, instead, for rehabilitative penal systems as a result of this view. I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, e.g., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.